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1 See C. Roueché, “Inscriptions and the Later History of the Theater,” in: R. 
R. R. Smith and K. T. Erim, eds., Aphrodisias Papers 2: The Theater, a Sculptor’s 
Workshop, and Coin Types, JRA Supp. 2 (Ann Arbor 1991) 99–108, esp. 99–102.
2 ὁ δῆμος τῆς λαμπροτάτης Ἀφροδεισιέων πόλεως Σουλπίκιον Πρεῖσκον τὸν 
διασημότατον ἀνθύπατον κατὰ τὰς τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ θειοτάτου κυρίου ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορος 
Σεου[ή]ρου [Ἀλεξάνδρου] [ἐντολάς] For the text, translation and commentary see J. 
Reynolds, Aphrodisias and Rome, JRS monographs no. 1 (London 1982) 173–76, doc. 47. 
3 . . . ἡδέως ἐλεύσομα[ι] [πρὸς] ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπιδημήσω ἐν τῇ λαμ[προτ]άτῃ πόλει 
ὑμῶν καὶ τῇ πατρίῳ ὑμῶν [θεᾷ] θύσω ὑπέρ τε τῆς σωτηρίας καὶ αἰω[ν]ίου διαμονῆς τοῦ 
τε κυρίου ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορος [Ἀλεξάνδρου] καὶ τῆς κυρ[ίας] ἡμῶν Σεβαστῆς [Μαμαίας] 
See Reynolds (above, n.2) 173–76, doc 48. 
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Government Centralization in late SeCond 
and third Century a.d. aSia minor:  
a WorkinG hypotheSiS 
ABSTRACT: This paper offers the working hypothesis that increased central 
government intervention in civic and provincial affairs in the late second- 
and third-century a.d. Roman Empire can be partly explained by the effects 
of the demographic contraction following the Antonine Plague pandemic. 
The sharp reduction in the number of people who could work and pay rents 
and taxes posed a direct threat to government revenues and elite incomes. 
The result, growing central government attempts at direct control of local 
surpluses and increased exploitation of the non-elite population, is then 
tentatively documented for Roman Asia Minor. 
I.
Probably sometime during the first half of the third century a.d., 
a small podium or loggia was added to the theater at Aphrodisias.1 It 
was inserted, somewhat carelessly, into the central block of seating, 
and presumably served as the platform for a separate, distinctive 
“seat of honor,” set apart, that is, from the normal “seats of honor” 
reserved for the city’s notables and dignitaries. Dating from roughly 
the same period we have two inscriptions, found together partly buried 
in the north stretch of the city wall. The first, a statue base, reads:
The people of the most splendid city of the Aphrodisians 
(set up a statue of) Sulpicius Priscus, perfectissimus 
vir, proconsul, according to [the instructions] of our 
greatest and most revered lord Imperator Severus 
[Alexander].2
On the second inscription, a stele, we find a letter by Sulpicius 
Priscus, the governor honored in the previous text. He writes to the 
Aphrodisians (lines 11–17):
I will gladly come to you and make a stay in your 
most splendid city and sacrifice to your native god-
dess for the safety and eternal continuance of our lord 
Imperator [Alexander] and our lady Augusta [Mamaia].3
The situation seems clear. The Aphrodisians had invited the gov-
ernor to come and stay with them and participate in the sacrificial 
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rituals, and the governor had accepted. But was this an incidental, 
casual visit? The new loggia inserted into the theater suggests not. 
Similar platforms for separate, distinctive seats of honor were added 
to the theaters of Tralles, Priene, Miletus, Termessos, Side and Nysa, 
all probably during the high and later imperial periods.4 Starting from 
this fact, Charlotte Roueché has argued for a connection between 
the inscriptions just cited and the construction of the new loggia, 
and suggests it was designed for governors to sit on during what 
were now frequent visits to cities to participate in festive and reli-
gious rituals.5 If true, this is highly significant. As is well known, 
for instance from inscribed seats found in theaters at Termessos, 
Roman Athens (theater of Dionysos), Lyon, Arles, and elsewhere, 
theaters, auditoria, and amphitheaters from Roman imperial times 
were not solely venues for games and festivals, but also served, 
by means of their seating arrangements, as spatial representations 
of the civic social hierarchy.6 The insertion of a new seat of honor 
into the theater in the third century, set distinctly apart from the 
seats of honor reserved for the civic elite, therefore suggests sym-
bolic and ideological recognition of the fact that a new top layer 
of authority had now become a more or less permanent part of the 
civic hierarchy. As Roueché argues, “such an arrangement ref lects 
the increasing involvement of imperial governors in what had been 
typical areas of civic activity.” 7 
Indeed, as is well known, from the third century a.d. onwards, 
governors and other imperial officials increasingly appear in our 
sources as far more directly involved in civic life than they had ever 
been before.8 At Aphrodisias, for example, honorific inscriptions that 
can be dated to the third century are almost without exception for 
imperial officials (governors or legati, some of them of local origin), 
emperors, and members of the imperial family, and not for the local 
elite benefactors who had dominated the honorific epigraphy of the 
city in the previous two centuries.9 The city of Perge in Pamphylia 
is another case in point. Its unusually rich epigraphic record yields 
numerous honorific and building inscriptions for the first and second 
centuries a.d., allowing the editor of the Perge volumes in the IK 
series, Sencer Şahin, to make detailed reconstructions of trends and 
developments in public building, office-holding, and munificence at 
Perge. With the advent of the third century, however, the picture changes 
radically. The total number of surviving inscriptions is drastically 
4 Roueché (above, n.1) 99–102.
5 Roueché (above, n.1) 100–101. She refers only to Reynolds (above, n.2) doc. 
48, but the two texts are obviously connected.
6 See O. M. van Nijf, The Civic World of Professional Associations in the Ro-
man East (Amsterdam 1997) ch. 6.
7 Roueché (above, n.1) 100–101.
8 V. Nutton, “The Beneficial Ideology” in: P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whit-
taker, eds., Imperialism in the Ancient World (Cambridge, London, and New York 
1978) 219–21 for the classic analysis.
9 C. Roueché, Aphrodisias in Late Antiquity: The Late Roman and Byzantine 
Inscriptions (rev. electronic 2nd ed.; 2004) http://insaph.kcl.ac.uk/ala2004. 
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reduced, and, if the epigraphic record is any guide, public benefac-
tions by private individuals practically cease, public building comes 
to a near standstill, and both honorific inscriptions for emperors and 
members of the imperial family and votive inscriptions for the gods 
are by and large conspicuously absent. Significantly, however, almost 
all honorific inscriptions that do survive from third-century Perge 
are for imperial officials, and these are linked to their benefactions 
towards the city.10 
Often, such greater involvement by the central government and 
its officials in provincial affairs is thought to have been a response 
to the conditions created by the so-called “crisis of the third century.” 
In most accounts, this crisis is presented as a rather confusing jumble 
of growing threats along the Empire’s borders, a rapid turnover of 
emperors, civil war, inf lation, increasing brigandage, and general, but 
rather unspecified, economic decline.11 Similarly, central government 
reaction to it is often seen as inconsistent, ad hoc, and ineffective. 
In this paper I shall argue that if we take into account a factor 
that has been rather undervalued in most existing accounts of the 
late second and third-century a.d. Roman world, namely the Empire’s 
long-term demographic development and its social and economic 
effects, we can offer a far clearer and more coherent explanation 
for the processes of centralization that appear to take place in the 
provinces than was possible before. My (brief ) test case for this 
argument, as will be apparent from the opening paragraphs of this 
paper, is one of the Empire’s richest and most urbanized provincial 
regions, Roman Asia Minor. First, however, we need to take a closer 
look at Roman population history.
II.
The early Roman Empire of the first and second centuries a.d. 
was a highly decentralized structure. Large provincial areas the size 
of modern European nation-states were ruled by governors with a 
small retinue of aides and advisers, while local government and 
jurisdiction, as well as the vitally important task of tax-gathering, 
were largely the responsibility of the local urban elites. The later 
Roman Empire of the fourth and fifth centuries a.d., by contrast, 
had a strongly centralized system of government, despite the division, 
10 See I.Perge II, pp. 1–2.
11 The bibliography is enormous, so my examples are necessarily highly selec-
tive. The classic analysis is M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of 
the Roman Empire, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1957) chs. 9–11. For an overview of the crisis 
from the point of view of the contemporary literary sources, see L. de Blois, “The 
Third Century Crisis and the Greek Élite in the Roman Empire,” Historia 33 (1984) 
358–77; G. Alföldi, “The crisis of the third century as seen by contemporaries,” GRBS 
15 (1974) 89–111; and Alföldi, The Social History of Rome (Baltimore and London, 
1988) ch. 6. For recent assessments see P. Garnsey and C. Humfress, The Evolution 
of the Late Antique World (Cambridge 2001); D. S. Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay, 
a.d. 180–395 (London 2004); P. Eich, Zur Metamorphose des politischen Systems in 
der römischen Kaiserzeit. Die Entstehung einer “personalen Bürokratie” im langen 
dritten Jahrhundert (Berlin 2005). 
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from the late fourth century onwards, into an eastern and a western 
half, with a much enlarged imperial bureaucracy, more numerous and 
smaller provinces, a far more centrally run tax system, and a much 
reduced role for the local civic elites, at least in administrative terms. 
How had this change come about? Many factors came into play, 
from internal civil wars to the need to defend Empire’s borders against 
growing pressure from the Sassanid Persian Empire in the east, and 
barbarians in Asia Minor and the western provinces. A factor largely 
ignored in many accounts, however, is that of the Empire’s long-term 
demographic development. As most scholars now agree, the Empire’s 
population grew, slowly but consistently, from the Late Republic/early 
first century a.d. onwards, until population growth was checked by the 
onset of the long series of smallpox epidemics known as the Antonine 
Plague in the 160s a.d., after which the population never reached 
early imperial levels again, despite a modest revival during the fourth 
century.12 Archaeological data series that can serve as chronological 
indices of the development of aggregate production and consumption 
over time broadly confirm this pattern of expansion and contraction 
of the population. We can point, for instance, to the chronological 
distribution of lead and copper pollution in the Greenland ice cap 
(evidence of Roman metal extraction and production) and of shipwrecks 
from the Mediterranean, to the rise and decline of public building, 
and to the chronology of Roman meat consumption, as reconstructed 
from animal bones found on dated sites.13 
This pattern of population rise and decline has important im-
plications for our interpretation of Roman economic, social, and, 
ultimately, political history.14 For, theoretically, a rise in population 
12 See B. W. Frier, “Demography” in A. K. Bowman, P. Garnsey, and D. 
Rathbone, The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed., vol. 11: The High Empire, a.d. 
70–192 (Cambridge 2000) 811–16; and Frier, “More is Worse: Some Observations 
on the Population of the Roman Empire” in W. Scheidel, ed., Debating Roman De-
mography (Leiden 2001) 139–59; R. P. Duncan-Jones, “The Impact of the Antonine 
Plague,” JRA 9 (1996) 108–36; W. M. Jongman, “The Rise and Fall of the Roman 
Economy: Population, Rents and Entitlement” in: P. F. Bang, M. Ikeguchi, and H. G. 
Ziche, eds., Ancient Economies and Modern Methodologies. Archaeology, Compara-
tive History, Models and Institutions (Bari 2007) 237–54. 
13 See F. de Callataÿ, “The Graeco-Roman Economy in the Super Long-run: 
Lead, Copper and Shipwrecks,” JRA 18 (2005) 361–72 for lead and copper pollution 
in the Greenland ice-cap and Mediterranean shipwrecks. For the rise and decline of 
public building see Duncan-Jones (above, n.12) 127, f igs. 10–11. For the chronology 
of Roman meat consumption see Jongman (above, n.12) 245 and Jongman,  “The Early 
Roman Empire: Consumption” in W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. Saller, eds., The 
Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge 2007) 613–14.
14 At this point I should like to acknowledge that the following analysis was much 
inspired by earlier attempts to apply population/resources modeling to Roman history 
in Frier, “More is Worse” (above, n.12), W. M. Jongman, The Economy and Society 
of Pompeii (Amsterdam 1991) esp. 85–98, and particularly Jongman (above, n.12). See 
also W. Scheidel, “Demographic and Economic Development in the Ancient Mediter-
ranean World,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (2004) 732–57. 
Classic applications of population/resources analysis to later European history are M. 
M. Postan, “Medieval Agrarian Society in its Prime” in Postan, ed., The Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe I: Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 
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in a preindustrial economy would lead to higher rents, lower wages, 
and pressure on the land, as the amount of land is fixed while popu-
lation grows, making labor abundant. Consequently, large landowners 
and employers become richer, while the situation of peasants, farmers 
(whether tenants or owner-occupiers), and wage laborers deteriorates. 
Social inequality increases. A fall in population figures, as after a 
major mortality catastrophe, would produce exactly the opposite re-
sult. Rents fall and wages rise, as land is abundant and labor scarce. 
Landlords become less well off, while the living standards of small 
farmers and wage laborers increase. Society becomes more equal. This, 
in a nutshell, was the development in medieval Europe in the centuries 
before and after the Black Death of the fourteenth century. Does the 
same scenario, however, also apply to Roman imperial history?
One problem with population/resources models such as the one 
just sketched is that they are based on the assumption that factor 
markets (i.e., of land, labor, and capital) were completely f lexible 
and responded directly to f luctuations in supply and demand. In re-
ality, of course, extra-economic factors, primarily the social, legal, 
political, and, ultimately, military power which elites were able to 
exert over direct producers had a distorting effect on the operation 
of markets.15 This is an objection with particular relevance to Roman 
imperial society. The Roman world’s large landowners at the same 
time constituted the Empire’s urban, provincial, and imperial elites 
and were hence situated at the pinnacle of power in all respects: 
economic, social, political, cultural, and religious.16 
Now, if we return to the subject of the Antonine Plague, it has 
been estimated that overall mortality from the plague may have been 
1966) 548–659; E. Le Roy Ladurie, Les Paysans du Languedoc, 2 vols. (Paris 1966) 
and W. Abel, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur, 3rd ed. (Hamburg and Berlin 1978). 
A good discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this type of modeling can 
be found in J. Hatcher and M. Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages (Oxford 2001). 
15 This argument against the population/resources (or neo-Malthusian/neo-
Ricardian) model of pre-industrial economic change was most successfully advanced 
by R. Brenner, “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial 
Europe,” Past and Present 70 (1976) 30–75. Brenner argued that, unlike in western 
Europe, in Europe east of the Elbe the population decline after the fourteenth cen-
tury did not lead to the escape of the peasantry from feudal bonds, but rather to a 
re-feudalization of society, as powerful eastern European landlords discovered the 
gains to be made on the western European grain markets. If elites were powerful 
enough, they could abuse the peasants regardless of demographic trends. Hence it 
was the structure of class relations that ultimately determined whether population 
decline would lead to a reduction of inequality. Jongman (above, n.12) 246–50 argues 
convincingly that Brenner’s model of developments in late medieval/early modern 
eastern Europe fits the situation of the third-century and later Roman Empire very well.
16 It is important to note that market distortions caused by socio-economic 
and political inequalities do not necessarily imply a redistribution of wealth from 
the bottom to the top. For instance, during the early Empire, when rents and wages 
should have moved, and probably by and large did move, in such a way as to in-
crease inequality, the elite’s extensive patronage networks (an index of their social 
and political power) might in fact have created a trickle-down effect that allowed 
sections of the lower classes to be slightly better off than they would have been if 
the distribution of income had been solely determined by market forces.
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in a range from 7–10 percent to 25–33 percent at worst.17 Areas most 
adversely affected, comparative evidence indicates, would have been 
those along the main trading and army routes,18 something which, 
incidentally, suggests that Asia Minor may have been hit particularly 
hard, given its extensive road network and the frequent movements 
of troops to and from the Euphrates frontier.19 Large concentrations 
of people were also highly vulnerable: according to Cassius Dio 
(73.14.3–4), a renewed outbreak in a.d. 189 caused 2,000 deaths a 
day in Rome. Given Roman imperial levels of urbanization and the 
frequency of long-distance movement of people, however, probably no 
major region of the Empire remained unaffected, and overall mortality 
was catastrophic.20 Yet unlike Western Europe in the aftermath of the 
Black Death, the third-century a.d. Roman Empire does not present us 
with a picture of happy, better off peasants and weakened landlords.21 
Why were outcomes different? One crucial factor, I think, was the im-
mense power and control Rome’s political elite of city-based landlords 
was able to exert over the cities’ agricultural territories and their rural 
populations, resulting from their domination in all social spheres.22
The demographic contraction caused by the Antonine pandemic 
must have had a direct negative impact on local elite incomes and 
imperial tax revenues, as there were simply far fewer people around 
than there had been before to work the land and pay rents and taxes. 
17 See R. J. and M. L. Littman, “Galen and the Antonine Plague,” AJP 94 
(1973) 252–55 (7–10 percent); W. H. McNeil, Plagues and Peoples (New York 1976, 
repr. 1994) 113 (25–33 percent). The most recent estimate, using sophisticated 
epidemiological modelling, suggests an overall mortality of 25 percent: Y. Zelener, 
Smallpox and the Disintegration of the Roman Economy after 165 a.d., unpub. PhD 
thesis, Columbia University 2003. For a summary see http://digitalcommons.libraries.
columbia.edu/dissertations/AAI3088458/. 
18 Duncan-Jones (above, n.12) 134–35.
19 S. Mitchell, Anatolia. Land, Men and Gods in Asia Minor. vol. 1: The Celts 
and the Impact of Roman Rule (Oxford 1993) 130–31, provides a convenient map. 
On the ravages caused by the Antonine Plague in Asia Minor see D. Magie, Ro-
man Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ. vol. 1: text 
(Princeton 1950) 663.
20 Duncan-Jones (above, n.12) 135–36.
21 Jongman (above, n.12).
22 In this respect, Rome may have been much closer in structure to other large, 
pre-industrial empires like China, and rather unlike the politically much more frac-
tured later medieval European world with its rural-based landlords and independent 
urban bourgeoisie. One anecdote neatly illustrates the extreme vulnerability of rural 
producers when faced with the demands of the city-based landlords. The Roman 
physician Galen tells how, during (frequently occurring) bad harvest years, “the 
city-dwellers, as it was their practice to collect and store enough grain for all the 
next year immediately after the harvest, left what remained to the country people, 
that is, pulses of various kinds, and they took a good deal of these too to the city. 
The country people f inished the pulses during the winter, and had to fall back on 
unhealthy foods during the spring; they ate twigs and shoots of trees and bushes, and 
bulbs and roots of indigestible plants; they filled themselves with wild herbs, and 
cooked fresh grass.” De Alim. Facult. 6.749–752. For comments see R. MacMullen, 
Enemies of the Roman Order (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 253; G. E. M. de Sainte Croix, 
The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (London 1981) 13–14; P. Garnsey 
and R. Saller, The Roman Empire. Economy, Society and Culture (London 1987) 97, 
from which I have taken the above translation.
arjan Zuiderhoek
45
How did the central government and local elites respond? I suggest 
that the central government increasingly attempted to bring provincial 
surpluses under its own direct control, by reducing the capacity of 
local elites to distribute resources as they saw fit and by taking the 
gathering of taxes largely into its own hands. Local elites, in turn, 
probably attempted to reduce the financial burdens brought on by 
office-holding, liturgies, and benefactions, and to increase the level 
of surplus extraction from their direct rural hinterland, in order to 
retain their customary levels of income. Let us now see whether there 
is any evidence, from the Empire in general, but from Asia Minor 
in particular, to back up such a scenario.
III.
Legal texts clearly reveal attempts by late second- and early 
third-century emperors to increase the imperial government’s con-
trol over the exaction and expenditure of provincial surpluses, tasks 
which were previously left to the local urban elites. Thus Septimius 
Severus ruled that funds donated by elite individuals for the welfare 
of citizens’ children (alimentary foundations) were from now on 
to be brought under the control of the provincial governor, where 
before these would mostly have been the responsibility of the local 
city councils.23 The same emperor also decreed that cities could not 
levy a new vectigal, that is, a local indirect tax, generally a toll or 
a market due, without the provincial governor’s explicit permission.24 
These sources illustrate once again the increasing control provincial 
governors gained over civic affairs during the early third century, a 
phenomenon already referred to above. Caracalla’s doubling of the 
inheritance tax and the tax on manumission, both traditionally paid 
only by Roman citizens but universalized by means of the Consti-
tutio Antoniniana of a.d. 212 which extended the franchise to most 
inhabitants of the Empire, provides clear indication of the central 
government’s determination not only to extend its control over but 
also significantly to increase imperial revenues.25 The increased ex-
ploitation of provincial communities by the central government which 
centralization made possible could also take the form of outsourcing 
some of the cost of central administration. Thus, as Michael Crawford 
has argued, the “enormous increase both in the number of Greek cities 
minting coins and in the volume of production” during the Severan and 
post-Severan ages, falling as it did “in a period when city autonomy 
was being progressively restricted and when city prosperity was to 
all appearances declining . . . should be regarded as the result of 
Imperial pressure and the coins minted in consequence as produced 
to meet fiscal burdens imposed by the central authority.”26 More 
direct attempts at expropriation of local surpluses were not shunned 
23 Dig. 35.2.89.
24 Cod. Iust. 4.62.1.
25 Cass. Dio 78.9.4–5.
26 M. Crawford, “Finance, Coinage and Money from the Severans to Constan-
tine,” in H. Temporini and W. Haase, eds., ANRW II.2 (1975) 572.
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either, as Herodian’s comments on the emperor Maximinus Thrax’s 
plundering of provincial cities’ resources reveal: 
He expropriated whatever public monies there were—
funds which had been collected for the grain supply 
or for distribution to the people, or earmarked for 
shows or festivals. Dedications in temples, statues of 
gods, honors to heroes, and whatever embellishment 
there was of a public nature, or adornment of a city, 
or material out of which money could be made—he 
melted all of it. . . . In the cities and provinces, the 
hearts of the masses were inflamed.27
Turning to the situation in Asia Minor specifically, we should 
note the considerable increase in the number of imperial estates in 
the early third century a.d. resulting from the extensive confisca-
tions of land by Septimius Severus (from individuals and cities that 
had supported his rival Pescennius Niger) and his direct successors.28 
Such a spectacular growth of imperial property naturally considerably 
increased the central government’s direct control over the region’s 
surpluses. The imperial center, however, also attempted to extend its 
hold over surplus extraction more generally, by centralizing taxation. 
From the early third century onwards, we find a growing presence 
in the region’s cities and countryside of central government officials 
who seem to have been primarily concerned with the gathering of 
taxes and supplies for the state. As Stephen Mitchell argues, the 
preservation of security seems insufficient as a sole explanation for 
the sheer numbers in which imperial officials ( frumentarii, station-
arii, colletiones) seem to have been present in third-century Asia 
Minor.29 Hence he argues that: 
it is more plausible that their chief purpose was the 
exaction of taxes and other contributions to the state 
. . . . City magistrates and publicani . . . played a dimin-
ishing role in the collection and delivery of cash and 
goods. Financial pressures may have made many more 
reluctant to fulfil their old functions as tax gatherers, 
especially as they were generally expected to stand as 
guarantors for the sums they handed over to Rome.30 
Thus, according to Mitchell, we are here confronted with a 
fundamental shift in imperial policy, which “heralds the age of 
Diocletian and Constantine, when the number of state officials had 
27 Herodian 7.3.4–6. Translation is by N. Lewis and M. Rheinhold, eds., Roman 
Civilization II: The Empire, 3rd ed. (New York 1990) 382–83
28 See T. R. S. Broughton, “Roman Asia Minor,” T. Frank, ed., An Economic 
Survey of Ancient Rome, vol. 4 (Baltimore 1938) 656–63 and 905–906 for the evi-
dence and discussion.
29 Mitchell (above, n.19) 232. For references to a selection of contemporary 
documents revealing the presence of these officials, see n.34 below.
30 Mitchell (above, n.19) 232.
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multiplied out of hand, and many earlier civic responsibilities had 
simply vanished from view.”31 Some caution is in order here, I think, 
as it seems to me unlikely that civic elites lost responsibility for 
taxation to the extent implied by Mitchell’s argument. In fact, we 
know that in the later Roman world, curiales were still concerned 
with taxation. Whether the centralization of taxation was therefore 
only partial, or mostly consisted of an extra layer of taxation added 
onto the existing system does not, however, really affect our argu-
ment. What matters is the bare fact that, even if Mitchell is only 
half correct, the sources do seem to point towards a clear central 
government attempt to gain greater direct control over provincial 
surplus extraction by means of centralizing the gathering of (some) 
taxes, and that this is precisely the sort of response expected from 
an imperial government facing a declining tax income brought on 
by demographic contraction. 
The titles of some of the officials in question, frumentarii, sta-
tionarii, colletiones, betray that originally their main task had been 
a different one. Frumentarii had originally been concerned with the 
supply of grain to army units and, apparently, secret police work, 
while stationarii were the police officers posted at stations along the 
Empire’s road system.32 Only the colletiones seem to have been tax 
officers originally.33 Given the nature of their original duties, both 
frumentarii and stationarii would have been present all over the region 
in fairly large numbers to begin with, as they were in other provinces. 
They might even have been far more ubiquitous in Asia Minor, as 
its extensive network of roads covered the main army routes to the 
Empire’s much fought over eastern borders. Hence they were a natural 
choice for an imperial government intent on (partly) centralizing its 
system of taxation. The fact, however, that the imperial government 
chose to work through such originally otherwise assigned officials 
rather than create a new category of official tax gatherers is indicative 
both of the relative haste with which the new policy was implemented 
and the pressing need to gain more control over taxation. Thus, the 
activities of the frumentarii etc. as tax gatherers should not solely be 
interpreted as part of a somewhat vaguely defined “militarization” 
of the eastern provinces, as Mitchell would have it. Rather, these 
activities can (also) be viewed as a fairly rational central government 
response to the problem of a shrinking tax income due to population 
decrease. This was a problem, of course, which was only aggravated 
by the fact that it occurred during a period when the government 
needed ever more money for troops to ward off the continuous and 
growing threats to the Empire’s borders east and west. Not that the 
new tax system worked perfectly: we mostly know about the activities 
of the frumentarii, stationarii, and colletiones through (responses to) 
31 Mitchell (above, n.19) 233
32 Mitchell (above, n.19) 232–34. On frumentarii see also Fiebiger, RE s. v. fru-
mentarii and J. C. Mann, “The Organization of the Frumentarii,” ZPE 74 (1988) 149–50.
33 Mitchell (above, n.19) 232–34 and L. Robert, Opera Minora Selecta I (Am-
sterdam 1969) 368.
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complaints by civilian and rural populations about illegal exactions 
and abuse at the hands of these very officials.34
Finally, what was the response of the local elites to the loss of 
manpower caused by the Antonine Plague? My hypothesis is that de-
clining rent incomes brought about by demographic contraction made 
them less keen to hold office, perform liturgies, and make public 
benefactions. The evidence for civic munificence in Asia Minor indeed 
shows a steep decline in the number of recorded benefactions from 
the 220s a.d.35 Particularly noteworthy in this context is the decline 
in numbers of the more expensive categories of benefactions. Con-
tributions to public building, the most popular form of munificence 
in Asia Minor during the first and second centuries, and particularly 
donations of whole buildings, easily the most costly form of public 
giving, show a sharp decline from the beginning of the third century.36 
Foundations are another case in point. These were donations of money 
or land from the revenues of which a benefaction (usually a festival) 
was to be financed at recurring intervals. As such, they were some 
eight to twenty times as expensive as one-off gifts of the same type, 
and therefore by and large the preserve of the higher elite echelons.37 In 
Asia Minor, they show a pronounced decline during the third century.38 
Local elites’ growing reluctance to hold office and spend their private 
wealth for the benefit of the community can also be deduced from a 
34 Examples include F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, Municipal Administration 
in the Roman Empire (Princeton 1926) nos. 142 (Ağabeyköy, territory of Philadelphia, 
Lydia, c. a.d. 200–250: villagers on an imperial estate complain about oppression by 
colletiones and other officials), 143 (Mendechora, also in the territory of Philadelphia, 
Lydia, c. a.d. 200–250: villagers protest against illegal exactions by colletiones, 
frumentarii, and “similar agents”), 144 (Ekiskucu, Lydia, c. a.d. 200–250: villag-
ers have had unbearable burdens placed upon them by stationarii, frumentarii, and 
colletiones); TAM V.1.154 (Demirci, close to Saittai, Lydia, early third-century a.d.: 
illegal exactions by stationarii, frumentarii, and colletiones); TAM V.1.419 (Kavacik, 
Lydian Catacecaumene, a.d. 247/8: frumentarii and colletiones make demands of 
villagers as if the latter were wartime enemies); TAM V.1.611 (village near Satala, 
Lydia, early third century a.d.: illegal exactions by frumentarii, colletiones, possibly 
stationarii). See Mitchell (above, n.19) 229–34.
35 This statement is based on the chronological analysis of a database of over 
500 epigraphically recorded benefactions from all over Asia Minor dating from the 
first to fourth centuries a.d. See A. Zuiderhoek, The Politics of Munificence in the 
Roman Empire. Citizens, Elites and Benefactors in Asia Minor (Cambridge 2009) fig. 
1.2. The time lag of some decades between the final cessation of the Antonine Plague 
and the decline in civic munificence is not surprising when we take into account 
built-up surpluses among local elites from the previous era of prosperity, projects 
already underway (buildings might take long to finish, foundations might take some 
time to amass sufficient revenues) and commitments already made, which might be 
hard to get out of, especially given increased imperial pressure on town councillors.
36 Mitchell (above, n.19) 198, 211–17; Zuiderhoek (above, n.35) 56–57, f ig. 4.1.
37 Assuming 12 percent interest on money put out on loan (generally the way 
in which a cash-based foundation would be made to generate revenues; for the 12 
percent interest rate see Pliny, Ep. 10.54), or 5 percent revenue per annum on landed 
property, for which see R. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire. Quan-
titative Studies, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1982) 33.
38 See B. Laum, Stiftungen in der griechischen und römischen Antike. Ein Beitrag 
zur antiken Kulturgeschichte I: Darstellung (Berlin 1914) 8–9, f ig II.
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series of contemporary legal texts from which it is clear that council 
membership, the holding of costly offices, and payment of liturgies 
became increasingly compulsory.39 
Did the provincial elite react to the threat, and reality, of declining 
incomes by increasing the exploitation of the tenants on their estates? 
There is little direct, unequivocal evidence from Asia Minor itself, as 
this is a topic on which inscriptions, our chief source of information, 
remain mostly silent. A small honorific inscription from Xanthos in 
Lycia, which may date to the Antonine period, mentions a local benefac-
tor who established a fund to relieve people unable to pay the regular 
land tax (tributum soli).40 If this text dates to the late second century 
a.d. it may offer us a glimpse of deteriorating conditions among the 
local peasantry. A petition to the two emperors Philip from tenants on 
an imperial estate at Aragua in the upper Tembris valley dating from 
the 240s a.d. mentions “powerful and inf luential men in the city” 
among those who extorted and made illegal exactions from the tenants, 
abuses that evidently had been going on for some time.41 If city-based 
landlords could get away, at least for a considerable period of time, 
with such blatant exploitation of small farmers even on a neighboring 
imperial estate, we have little cause to be optimistic about the condition 
of the tenants working their own estates. In general, we can say that 
the fairly complex managerial hierarchy already existing on the private 
estates of absentee landowners in Asia Minor, as revealed by some 
late second- and third-century a.d. inscriptions from Pisidia, would 
easily have allowed for an increase in the exploitation of the direct 
peasant-producers without unduly driving up the costs of oversight.42
Stephen Mitchell has argued for continuing general rural pros-
perity in (central Anatolian) Asia Minor during the third century, 
39 E.g. Dig. 50.1.18; 50.1.21 pr; 50.2.6.4; 50.2.7.3; 50.4.3.15–16 and 50.4.4. In 
general, see P. Garnsey, “Aspects of the Decline of the Urban Aristocracy in the 
Empire” in H. Temporini, ed., ANRW II.1 (Berlin and New York 1974) 229–52, re-
published with bibliographical addendum in P. Garnsey, Cities, Peasants and Food 
in Classical Antiquity. Essays in Social and Economic History, W. Scheidel, ed. 
(Cambridge 1998) 3–27. 
40 TAM II 291 with the comments of Benndorf ad loc.
41 IGR IV 598 = CIL III 14191. The tenants mention a previous petition con-
cerning the same abuses, leading to imperial instructions to the provincial governor 
to right the wrongs in question, but apparently to little effect. Interestingly, most 
known petitions to emperors by provincials complaining of local maltreatment by 
landlords, soldiers, or imperial personnel cluster roughly in the period 181–249 a.d.; 
see T. Hauken, Petition and Response: An Epigraphic Study of Petitions to Roman 
Emperors, 181–249 (Bergen 1998). These were the decades during which the effects 
of demographic contraction and the socio-political disorder caused by the epidem-
ics will have been most strongly felt at the local and provincial level. See also P. 
Hermann, Hilferufe aus römischen Provinzen: ein Aspekt der Krise des römischen 
Reiches im 3. Jhd. n. Chr. (Göttingen 1990).
42 See in particular IGR IV 889, dated a.d. 207–208, referring to the situation 
on large estates in the territory of the Ormelian people to the west of the town of 
Olbasa, and IGR IV 894 from the estate of M. Calpurnius Longus at neighboring 
Alastus. Between landowner and peasant-producer we find, more or less in descend-
ing order, procurators (epitropoi) who on behalf of the landowner leased out part of 
the land to leaseholders (misthotai) who then extracted rent from the peasants, and 
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basing his argument on the uninterrupted series of votive and fu-
nerary inscriptions surviving from villages and country districts.43 
Such a continuation of rural epigraphic habits might indeed point to 
a relative absence of the sort of social and political disruption com-
monly associated with the third-century crisis, such as, for instance, 
widespread brigandage. If, however, we view developments on the 
land during the early third century as primarily conditioned by de-
mographic contraction and increasing exploitation of rural producers, 
the argument does not hold much water. For setting up inscriptions 
would mostly be beyond the means of the poorer rural producers, 
who would have made up the larger part of the agricultural work-
force. What the ongoing proliferation of inscriptions does ref lect is 
the continued existence of at least a certain level of prosperity at 
intermediate and elite levels, which, on the assumption of an increase 
in the exploitation of direct rural producers to offset the effects of 
demographic contraction, is precisely what we might expect. Among 
other texts, Mitchell refers to the records of a religious association, 
the Xenoi Tekmoreioi (Tekmoreian Guest Friends), that were found 
in the territory of Pisidian Antioch. Some of the documents list 
subscriptions paid by members. In one series of texts, dating to a.d. 
238, these payments range from 161 to 1,090 denarii.44 Even allowing 
for some inf lation, these sums are the equivalent of several times 
to more than thirty times annual subsistence.45 The conclusion can 
only be that the people paying these subscriptions must have been 
owners of medium-sized and larger estates (or persons of equivalent 
wealth), not the small tenants and agricultural workers who made 
up the bulk of the rural workforce and who paid in hard labor for 
their landlords’ epigraphic display.46 
Given the peculiarities of our source material, evidence for 
an increased squeezing of the tenants in third-century Asia Minor 
agents ( pragmateutai/oikonomoi) who may have been involved in overseeing and 
collecting dues from those parts of the estates not leased out or worked by means 
of corvée labor during peak periods in the agricultural year. The situation by and 
large mirrors that known from estates in imperial North Africa, and, presumably, 
much of the rest of the Empire. For discussion see Broughton (above, n.28) 672–73, 
who quotes both texts in full; Mitchell (above, n.19) 163–64, with n.198 for refer-
ences to further evidence. 
43 Mitchell (above, n.19) 239–40.
44 Mitchell (above, n.19) 239 and Ruge, RE s.v. (Xenoi) Tekmoreioi.
45 My estimate of the Roman annual subsistence ration is based on the assump-
tion that subsistence needs equal 250 kg wheat equivalent per person/year. A wheat 
price of HS 3 per modius of 6.55 kg then puts the costs of one year’s subsistence 
at HS 115, or about 30 denarii. For an annual subsistence need of 250 kg wheat 
equivalent see C. Clark and M. Haswell, The Economics of Subsistence Agriculture 
(London 1970), 57ff. and 175; K. Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire 
(200 b.C.–a.d. 400),” JRS 70 (1980) 118 with n.51. For a wheat price of HS 3 per 
modius see Rostovtzeff, RE s.v.frumentum, 149; Hopkins (above, this n.) 118–19; 
Duncan-Jones (above, n.37) 51; Jongman (above, n.14) 195 with n.2. 
46 Broughton (above, n.28) 674–75 suggests that “the persons involved [in the 




remains thin on the ground, even though more detailed research is 
likely to reveal more instances. The gradual economic, social, and 
legal oppression of the rural masses is, however, a phenomenon so 
integral to the economic and social development of the later Empire 
from the third century onwards that it is hard to see how Asia Minor 
could have been an exception.47
IV.
In this paper, I have proposed the thesis, using Asia Minor as 
an initial test case, that the tendencies towards greater government 
centralization and exploitation in the late second- and early third-
century a.d. Roman Empire were a rational response by the central 
government and provincial elites to a decline in their tax and rent 
incomes brought about by demographic contraction. For the moment, 
this remains by and large a working hypothesis. It does not (and 
should not be taken to) deny the importance of other factors, such as 
continuous warfare on the borders, the requisitioning of supplies by 
passing armies, the depreciation of the silver coinage, the growing 
pressure on the urban councils, and a host of other developments 
that are generally considered to be part of the third-century crisis. 
Yet it may point the way, ultimately, to a story of Rome’s decline 
and fall in which the interplay of population, epidemic disease, and 
an ever-growing accumulation of power in the hands of a tiny elite 
assumes just as much, if not more, importance than the internal 
political conf licts and barbarian invasions often alluded to in the 
more traditional accounts.48 
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47 The burden of proof, at least, is on those who want to claim so.
48 I would like to thank Peter Garnsey, Wim Jongman, and the anonymous 
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